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N “Taxing Punitive Damages,” Gregg D. Polsky and Dan Markel ar-
gue that defendants paying punitive damages are under-punished rela-
tive to juries’ intentions, because tax-unaware juries do not take into ac-
count the fact that the deductibility of punitive damages significantly re-
duces defendants’ after-tax costs.1 They note that the Obama administra-
tion has proposed addressing the under-punishment problem by 
amending the Internal Revenue Code to disallow deductions for punitive 
damages (and for settlements paid on account of punitive damage 
claims)2 They conclude, however, that the proposal would be ineffective 
because defendants could avoid its impact by disguising nondeductible 
punitive damage settlements as deductible compensatory damage set-
tlements.3 They argue that a superior approach would be to leave federal 
tax law unchanged and to change jury instructions in punitive damage 
cases instead.4 If juries were explicitly told that punitive damages were 
deductible, they could “gross up” the awards to impose the desired level 
of after-tax punishment on defendants. In contrast with the Obama ad-
ministration’s proposal, this non-tax, non-federal solution to the under-
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punishment problem would not be undermined by pre-trial settlements: 
“Gross ups, in addition to increasing jury verdicts, would increase set-
tlement values because litigants determine these values in the shadow of 
what a jury would be expected to award.”5 
Their argument is powerful and original. It may have dramatic real-
world effects, if it inspires plaintiffs’ lawyers across the nation to request 
the jury instructions required to produce tax-aware juries, and if courts 
grant those requests. In this brief Response, however, I raise two possi-
ble objections to their analysis. The first objection is that they do not 
consider the alternative of a nondeductibility rule applicable to punitive 
damages but not to settlements of punitive damage claims. This narrow-
er nondeductibility rule is arguably superior to both broader nondeducti-
bility and tax-aware juries. The second objection is that they do not con-
sider how their analysis would change if deterrence, rather than 
punishment, were viewed as the primary function of punitive damages. 
Although these are considerably more than quibbles, they do not detract 
from my view of their article as a major contribution to the scholarly li-
terature on the intersection of torts and taxes, with the potential for sig-
nificant real-world impact. The Response closes with a brief observation 
on the relationship between the article, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and 
ten-dollar bills on sidewalks. 
I. SHOULD THE PROPOSED NONDEDUCTIBILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
EXTEND TO SETTLEMENTS? 
As explained above, Polsky and Markel argue that tax-aware juries 
are preferable to the Obama administration’s proposal to make punitive 
damages nondeductible because defendants could avoid the nondeducti-
bility of punitive damages by mislabeling punitive damage settlements 
as compensatory damage settlements. The administration’s proposal 
would formally apply to settlements as well as to judgments: “No deduc-
tion would be allowed for punitive damages paid or incurred by the tax-
payer, whether upon a judgment or in settlement of a claim.”6 Polsky 
and Markel argue persuasively, however, that settling parties would al-
most always claim the entire settlement was with respect to actual dam-
ages, and that the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) would have great 
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difficulty in challenging the parties’ allocations.7 Because jury tax 
awareness suffers from no comparable weakness, Polsky and Markel ar-
gue that it is a superior response to the under-punishment problem 
caused by the deductibility of punitive damages under current law.8 
Their argument is persuasive as a critique of the administration’s pro-
posal; under the proposal punitive damage settlements are supposed to 
be nondeductible, but that supposed nondeductibility is largely unenfor-
ceable. Consider, however, an alternative proposal, under which punitive 
damages would be nondeductible, but a settlement would remain fully 
deductible—even if the parties explicitly acknowledged that a portion of 
the settlement was on account of punitive damages. There is a plausible 
argument—based on principle, rather than merely on the impracticality 
of identifying the punitive components of settlements—for this alterna-
tive proposal. 
When a case goes to trial and results in an award of punitive damages, 
the jury (or judge) has determined that the defendant engaged in conduct 
sufficiently reprehensible to warrant punishment. If the jury is not tax-
aware, allowing the defendant to deduct its punitive damages results in 
the defendant suffering less punishment than the jury intended. Assum-
ing the courts continue to operate with tax-unaware juries, disallowing 
deductions for punitive damages is necessary to produce the jury-
intended level of punishment. When a case is settled, however, there has 
been no determination by the legal system that the defendant engaged in 
punishable conduct, let alone a determination of the proper dollar 
amount of punishment. It is surely true that, in many settlements with a 
punitive component (whether acknowledged or unacknowledged by the 
parties), the likelihood that a jury would have awarded punitive damages 
if there had been a trial is well below fifty percent. A defendant will of-
ten be willing to make a substantial settlement payment to avoid even a 
small risk of a large punitive damage award at trial. Studies have found 
that plaintiffs are awarded punitive damages in only about two or three 
percent of all cases that go to trial—plaintiffs prevail in roughly half of 
the litigated cases and are awarded punitive damages in four to six per-
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cent of the cases in which they prevail.9 Although settled cases may not 
closely resemble litigated cases in their potential for punitive damages,10 
the very small percentage of punitive damage awards in litigated cases 
suggests that a large proportion of defendants making payments to settle 
punitive damage claims would not have been found liable for punitive 
damages at trial. 
Even if the IRS could identify with perfect accuracy in every instance 
how much of a settlement was paid with respect to punitive damage 
claims, in many—probably most—cases of punitive damage settlements 
the jury would not have awarded punitive damages if the case had gone 
to trial. If (1) the legal system has made no determination that the tax-
payer engaged in conduct warranting punishment, (2) more likely than 
not, the legal system would not have made such a determination had the 
case proceeded to trial, and (3) there is no way of knowing what the 
amount of punitive damages would have been if punitive damages had 
been awarded, then it is far from obvious that the taxpayer will be under-
punished if it is allowed to deduct the entire amount of the settlement. 
There is a strong argument that disallowing a deduction to avoid under-
punishment should be limited to cases in which a jury (or judge) has ac-
tually determined (1) that the taxpayer engaged in punishable conduct, 
and (2) the appropriate dollar amount of punishment. If that argument is 
accepted, the Obama administration’s proposal should be revised to ex-
empt settlements from its scope—for reasons that have nothing to do 
with any concerns about enforceability of the broader disallowance. 
There is a close precedent for such a limitation on the scope of a de-
duction-disallowance rule intended to prevent under-punishment. Sec-
tion 162(g) of the Internal Revenue Code, enacted in 1969, denies a de-
duction for two-thirds (that is, the punitive portion) of antitrust treble 
damages, but only if the taxpayer has been convicted of a criminal viola-
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tion of federal antitrust laws (or has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere in 
such a case). According to the 1969 Report of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee, “This means that the deduction is to be denied only in the case of 
‘hard-core violations’ where intent has been clearly proved in a criminal 
proceeding.”11 The argument here is similar. Only if it has been “clearly 
proved in a [civil] proceeding” that the taxpayer has engaged in conduct 
warranting punitive damages has the legal system made a punishment 
determination the integrity of which must be ensured by the denial of a 
tax deduction. 
Because of the design and rationale of this alternative proposal—
applying only to punitive damage judgments, because the logic of the 
proposal extends no further—the proposal is not undermined when de-
fendants avoid the disallowance rule by settling their cases. Unlike the 
administration’s proposal, the revised proposal would function in prac-
tice just as it is intended to function in theory. Polsky and Markel claim 
that jury tax awareness is superior to the administration’s proposal as a 
means of achieving the goals of the administration’s plan, because of the 
unenforceability of the settlement aspect of the proposal. Theirs is a po-
werful critique of the administration’s proposal, but it does not apply to 
the revised proposal suggested here. In the absence of any disconnect 
between the purpose and the actual operation of the revised proposal, 
there would be no reason to look to jury tax awareness as a non-tax, 
non-federal substitute for deduction denial. In short, if one is persuaded 
that the policy concern about under-punishment is adequately addressed 
by a deduction denial that does not extend to settlements, then there is 
no reason to consider a non-tax solution. Indeed, the tax solution is far 
superior, if for no other reason than Congress’s ability to enact it in one 
fell swoop, rather than depending on the jury-awareness decisions of the 
courts of the fifty states. 
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS DETERRENCE 
Polsky and Markel base their analysis on the assumption that punitive 
damages are fundamentally about punishing defendants. In the first sen-
tence of their article they state, “As the name implies, punitive damages 
are principally awarded to punish defendants for torts committed with a 
malicious or reckless state of mind.”12 The preceding Part of this Re-
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sponse accepted that characterization for the sake of argument. This 
Part, however, questions that characterization and explains that the anal-
ysis changes dramatically under a plausible alternative characterization. 
In a footnote supporting the claim of their first sentence, Polsky and 
Markel include quotations from three Supreme Court cases, all of which 
indicate that the purposes of punitive damages are to punish and to de-
ter.13 This view of punitive damages as serving a deterrence function is 
not peculiar to the Supreme Court. The standard account of punitive 
damages as a deterrent focuses on a defendant engaging in a dangerous 
course of conduct. The defendant’s conduct harms a number of persons, 
but for one reason or another the defendant escapes liability for most of 
the harm. Suppose, for example, the defendant’s course of conduct im-
poses $1 million of harm on each of ten victims, but only one of the ten 
successfully sues the defendant. If the defendant owes that successful 
plaintiff only $1 million of actual damages, the defendant will pay for 
only ten percent of the total harm and will be greatly underdeterred. 
Adding $9 million of punitive damages to the successful plaintiff’s ac-
tual damages, however, would force the defendant to internalize the cost 
of all the harm it caused, thereby producing the appropriate level of de-
terrence.14 The punitive damages serve as a substitute for the $9 million 
of actual damages the defendant does not pay its other victims. 
If the defendant had paid $1 million actual damages to each of its ten 
victims, the defendant would have been entitled to deduct the entire $10 
million. That is true under current law, and would remain true under ei-
ther the Obama administration’s proposal or the proposal suggested 
above. That result—full deductibility of the $10 million—is also appro-
priate as a matter of deterrence. In deciding how much to spend on acci-
dent prevention, the defendant will be comparing the cost of tax-
deductible safety precautions with the alternative of damage payments. 
Given the clear deductibility of safety precautions as business expenses, 
the damages alternative must also be deductible if the defendant is to 
have the incentive to take safety precautions up to—but not beyond—the 
cost-effective level. Nondeductibility of damages would create a tax pre-
ference for safety precautions over damages, resulting in overdeterrence 
(that is, excessive spending on precautions). 
 
13 Id. & n.1 (quoting Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2621 (2008); Philip 
Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007); and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323, 350 (1974)). 
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Nothing in the above analysis changes if the defendant pays the entire 
$10 million to one victim (as $1 million actual damages and $9 million 
punitive damages), instead of paying $1 million to each victim. The 
proper level of deterrence will be achieved if, and only if, the defendant 
is allowed to deduct the entire $10 million. In short, under the deterrence 
theory of punitive damages, the current deductibility of punitive damag-
es (and settlements) is entirely appropriate and should not be legislative-
ly altered. Moreover, under the deterrence theory there is no reason to 
inform the jury that the defendant will be able to deduct punitive damag-
es. If a tax-unaware jury is provided with the evidence (relating to the 
number of uncompensated victims of the defendant and the extent of 
their harms) and the jury instructions (explaining the deterrence function 
of punitive damages) necessary to implement the deterrence theory of 
punitive damages, it will produce the correct $9 million punitive damage 
award in the hypothetical case. Informing the jury that the defendant can 
deduct the $9 million would serve no purpose; it would only create a 
risk that the jury would incorrectly increase the award above $9 million 
to produce a $9 million after-tax cost to the defendant. 
Polsky and Markel assume that punitive damages are about nothing 
but punishment, and argue—quite persuasively, if one accepts their 
premise—that either punitive damages should be nondeductible or (bet-
ter yet) juries should be made tax-aware. The discussion here has argued 
that deterrence is a significant purpose of punitive damages, and that 
neither nondeductibility nor tax-aware juries would be appropriate if pu-
nitive damages were about only deterrence. In reality, of course, puni-
tive damages are about both punishment and deterrence. The relative 
significance of the two purposes is crucial to the evaluation of the merits 
of proposals for both nondeductibility and jury tax awareness. If one 
agrees with Polsky and Markel that the punishment rationale is far more 
important than the deterrence rationale, then one should favor either 
nondeductibility or tax-aware juries. If one believes that the deterrence 
rationale dominates the punishment rationale, then one should favor nei-
ther reform proposal. If one believes that the two rationales are of rough-
ly equal importance—unfortunately, a very reasonable thing to be-
lieve—then formulating policy prescriptions will be considerably more 
difficult. 
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III. IS THAT TEN-DOLLAR BILL REALLY THERE? 
There is an old joke about two economists walking down the street. 
“One sees a $10 bill lying on the sidewalk and asks, ‘Isn’t that a $10 
bill?’ ‘Obviously not,” says the other. ‘If it were someone would have 
already picked it up.’”15 Polsky and Markel claim that state courts would 
generally be receptive if plaintiffs’ lawyers were to request jury instruc-
tions designed to produce grossed-up punitive damage awards,16 but that 
it has never occurred to any plaintiffs’ lawyer to make the request.17 If 
they are right, the oversight by plaintiffs’ lawyers is truly astounding. 
The argument for grossing up punitive damages is straightforward 
enough, and plaintiffs’ lawyers are not known for their propensity to 
leave money on the table (or sidewalk). The oversight is particularly re-
markable given that a closely analogous issue—whether juries should be 
informed that plaintiffs’ personal injury damages are not subject to fed-
eral income tax—has been litigated in a number of jurisdictions.18 
One of two things must be true—either Polsky and Markel are wrong 
in predicting that courts would be receptive to plaintiffs’ lawyers’ argu-
ments for tax-aware juries, or plaintiffs’ lawyers have been stunningly 
remiss in failing to make those arguments. The latter is certainly possi-
ble. After all, the old economists’ joke is funny precisely because some-
times there really is a ten-dollar bill on the sidewalk. On the other hand, 
this is not a matter of a ten-dollar bill being on the sidewalk for a few 
minutes; this is a matter of plaintiffs’ lawyers having failed for decades 
to pick up millions upon millions of dollars. If that turns out to have 
been the case—if courts are receptive to the tax-aware jury arguments 
when plaintiffs’ lawyers finally make them—the puzzle of the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers who did not pick up the millions should be high on the research 
agenda of anthropologists of the legal profession. 
 
15 Roger A. Arnold, Economics 472 (8th ed. 2008). 
16 Polsky & Markel, supra note 1, at 1322 (“We . . . believe that under current tort law in 
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quences of payments of punitive damages.”). 
17 Id. at 1305 & nn. 22–24. 
18 Id. at 1310–13. 
